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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STEVEN L. WEST,
----~

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

-I

MILES N. ANDERSON, HAL ANDERSON, CLYDE ANDERSON,
MALCOLM N. McKINNON, dba
AMERICAN FUEL COMPANY,
and CLYDE COX,

Case No. 8294

Defendants and Appellants. ,

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
STEVEN L. WEST

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the most part the respondent, Steven L. West, concurs
in the Statement of Facts set forth in appellant's brief. However, in respect to the plaintiff's earning capacity, the statement
is erroneous. On page 11, in the defendant's Statement of
Facts and again on pages 39 and 40 in the argument, the
defendants contend that the only evidence of the plaintiff's
5
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loss of earning capacity was that in 1951 he made around
$2,400.00 prospecting and hauling coal, and in 1952 he made
around $2,600.00, and at the time of the accident he was earning $300.00 per month. Defendants state that there was no
evidence in the record whatsoever that plaintiff was qualified
or could earn an excess of $3{)0.00 per month. Such we submit
is not the fact. With regard to Mr. West's 1951 earnings, he
testified that he worked on and off for a period of about five
months and that the rest of the time he was prospecting,
which produced him no income (R-336). Mr. West further
testified (R-334) that he could, and did, gross in some months
as much as $800.00. His testimony also indicates that he could
make four trips per week and make a net profit on each trip
of $45.00. Even based upon three trips per week in which
he would gross $60.00 per trip, or a total of $180.00, his
expenses for the three trips being $45.00, Mr. West would
net $135.00 per week, or an average of $540.00 per month.
On redirect examination, (R-356), Mr. West made it clear
that his gross salary was $300.00 per month and that out of
the $300.00 his income taxes would be deducted.
There are certain additional facts not contained in the
defendant's statement of facts to which the plaintiff desires
to call the attention of the Court. Exhibit P-4, reproduced
in plaintiff's brief, distorts the distances and makes it appear
that the truck was facing the position where Mr. West was
injured. Exhibit P-7 and the defendant Cox's, testimony
(R-186-190), more clearly and more accurately illustrates the
relative positions of the truck, scoopmobile, and Mr. West.
The defendant, Cox, testified that the truck "described an
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arc," indicating that the wheels of the truck were cramped
considerably to the left (R-208). At the time, the defendant
Hal Anderson parked the truck, he did so under the direction
of the defendant Cox (R-252-R-178). The defendant Cox
saw Hal Anderson leave his truck after he had parked it and
also saw him go down the canyon to his brother's truck. This
he had seen before he started to load the truck (R-183-184 and
R-190). The evidence also indicates that the defendant Cox
knew where West was before he started to load the truck
(R-196) and further, that he was looking at West while the
truck was moving (R-215). The defendant Cox testified that
he did not check the brakes (R-198). This evidence is undisputed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE DEFENDANTS, MALCOLM McKINNON AND
CLYDE COX, WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS
FOUND BY THE JURY BECAUSE CLYDE COX, IN
LOADING A TRUCK UNATTENDED ON A GRADE
WITH THE WHEELS TURNED IN A DOWN HILL DIRECTION, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY UPON HAL
ANDERSON HAVING SO SECURELY BRAKED THE
TRUCK THAT IT WOULD NOT RUN DOWN HILL AND
CAUSE GRAVE INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF, STEVEN WEST, WAS NOT GUlLTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF
7
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LAW IN SITTING DOWN BY THE SIDE OF THE MAIN
TRAVELED WAY ON A PILE OF COAL WITHOUT BEING ATTENTIVE MERELY BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND
CLYDE COX GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE, BECAUSE, THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ACTS AND
FAILURE TO ACT OF COX AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE ACTS OF WEST WERE ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT.
POINT III
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT
DO N 0 T OVER-ACCENTUATE THE PLAINTIFF'S
THEORY, BECAUSE, SUCH INSTRUCTIONS WERE
GIVEN TO ENABLE THE JURY TO ANSWER THE
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SUBMITTED TO THEM.
POINT IV
THE SUBMISSION OF THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORY TO THE JURY REGARDING THE LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF STEVEN L. WEST WAS PROPER
BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY OF MR. WEST AND THE
TESTIMONY OF THE DOCTOR WHO ATTENDED MR.
WEST SUPPORTED THE SUBMISSION OF THE QUESTION OF LOSS OF YEARLY EARNING CAPACITY TO
THE JURY.
POINT V
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION, NUMBER 9 (a) REGARDING THE RIGHT TO RELY ON DUE CARE OF
8
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ANOTHER, AND NUMBER 12 REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
ORDINARY CARE OF COX, ARE NOT CONTRADICTORY INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE CLYDE COX DID
NOT HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO RELY UPON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT HAL ANDERSON WOULD
NOT BE NEGLIGENT, BUT COULD ONLY SO RELY
UNTIL SOME ACT WAS DONE BY HAL ANDERSON
TO INDICATE TO THE CONTRARY OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATED THAT !IAL ANDERSON MIGHT
BE NEGLIGENT.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
THE GIVING AND THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE INSTRUCTIONS COMPLAINED OF BY THE DEFENDANT
BECAUSE IN SUBMITTING A CASE TO THE JURY ON
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, ONLY SUCH INSTRUCTIONS AS WILL ENABLE THE JURY TO INTELLIGENTLY ANSWER THE INTERROGATORIES NEED BE GIVEN.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANTS, MALCOLM McKINNON AND
CLYDE COX, WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS
FOUND BY THE JURY BECAUSE CLYDE COX, IN
LOADING A TRUCK UNATTENDED ON A GRADE
9
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WITH THE WHEELS TURNED IN A DOWN HILL DIRECTION, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY UPON HAL
ANDERSON HAVING SO SECURELY BRAKED THE
TRUCK THAT IT WOULD NOT RUN DOWN HILL AND
CAUSE GRAVE INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF.
The defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox
contend that they were not guilty of any negligence which
was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. The
defendants state on page 12 of their brief that, "the only
issue raised by defendants' motion for a directed verdict is
was there sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of
whether Clyde Cox was negligent by failing to ascertain that
the dump truck was so securely braked or the wheels blocked,
before starting to load it; and was he required to foresee that
if this was not done, the truck would roll down hill and
against and upon the plaintiff?' " This we submit is the primary question for the court to determine upon appeal. The
defendants assert that if Steven West could assume the truck
was securely braked that Clyde Cox was entitled to the same
assumption. It is apparently the defendants position that Clyde
Cox had the absolute right to rely upon the assumption that
Hal Anderson would not be negligent and that there was
nothing about the situation to give him notice to the contrary.
The jury was instructed upon this proposition as follows:
"9- (a) : You are further instructed that any person has
a right to reply upon the assumption that other people
will not be negligent unless and until some act is done
by the other person to indicate to the contrary."
Under the instruction, as given, in order to find that
Clyde Cox was negligent by failing to ascertain that the dump
10
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truck was so securely braked or blocked that it would not run
down hill while he was loading it, the jury must have found
that there were some acts done by Hal Anderson which would
indicate that he had not braked or blocked the truck. Several
acts of substandard conduct existed which should have indicated to Cox that some extra precaution should be taken. The
truck was placed in his presence on a grade facing in a downhill direction. The wheels were also turned in a downhill
direction and Hal Anderson immediately left the truck after
he had parked it on the grade. While Clyde Cox stated that
he didn't notice that the wheels were turned in a downhill
direction (R-179), he did testify that the scoopmobile which
he was operating was to the righthand side of the truck and
had he looked, he would have been able to see that the wheels
were turned in a downhill direction (R-1 79). Having failed
to look, or failing to see, he is placed under the same obligation as though he had seen it. This one circumstance is sufficent to put him on notice that Hal Anderson might have been
negligent. Instruction 9- (a), as given, does not clearly and accurately state the law, but the error, if any, was in favor of Cox
and McKinnon, so they can't complain of it, and we submit
that the appeal should be considered in the light of the law
as it should have been given. Actually, a correct instruction
on this phase of the law should have been given as follows:
"You are further instructed that a person has the
right to rely upon the assumption that other people will
not be negligent when an ordinary prudent person
would so assume. In determining whether an ordinary
prudent person would assume that other people will
not be negligent, you may take into consideration all
the facts and circumstances of the stituation, the acts
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of failure to act of the third person and the class or
type of person or persons involved."
The essential distinctions between the instruction as given
and as suggested are that rather than there be an absolute right
to rely upon another's being non-negligent, that right exists
only when an ordinary prudent man would so rely. And that,
rather than the right to rely, continuing until some act is done
by the third person to indicate the contrary, the indication
may come through the static facts of the situation, any circumstances attendant, failure to act upon the part of third
persons or the type or class of person being dealt with. These
propositions are discussed at length later in this brief.
In order to properly analyze the aforementioned rules,
we should first consider the basic rules as to the "scope of
duty" and the quantum of caution required in situations such
as the case at bar. An excellent discussion of this matter is
found in Flemming James' article in 3 Utah Law Review 275,
entitled "Nature of Negligence." The essence of the article
is that negligence is conduct which exposes another to an unreasonable risk of harm. The statement of the rule was approved by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Hilliard t'S.
Utah By-Products Company (Utah) 263 Pac. 2nd 287, page
290, as follows:
"One is guilty of negligence when 'he does such an
act or omits to take such a precaution that under the
circumstances present, as an ordinary prudent person,
he ought to reasonably foresee that he will thereby expose the interest of another to an unreasonable risk of
harm.' When one does so, he may be held liable for
resulting injuries caused by any reasonably foreseeable
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conduct, whether it be innocent, negligent, or even
criminal."
The amount of caution required or an ordinary prudent
person in any situation is measured by the following standards:
( 1) The likelihood that the conduct will injure others, taken
with ( 2) the seriousness of the harm threatened and balanced
against ( 3) the interest which must be sacrificed to avoid the
risk.
Fleming James in his article in 3 Utah Law Review 281-2
sets forth these standards as follows:
"1. The amount of caution required tends to increase
with the likelihood that the actor's conduct will injure
others."

2. "The amount of caution required tends to increase
with the seriousness of the injury, if it happens."

3·. "The interest which must be sacrificed to avoid the
risk is balanced against the danger."
We can measure the amount of caution required of Cox
in this case to fulfill his duty to West by applying the foregoing standards. The truck was parked facing down hill with
its wheels turned downhill, and in the direction of Steve West.
It was there to be loaded with coal out of a scoopmobile. The
loading operation tends to jostle the truck. Hal Anderson, the
driver, had left, prior to the time Cox started to load. All
these things Cox actually knew or was legally bound to have
known. To state that it is unlikely that the truck would break
loose is to ignore a human experience. Trucks and motor
vehicles can and frequently do break away and run down hill
when parked upon a hill. The defendants concede on page
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27 of their brief that: "The probability of the truck rolling
forward if not properly braked was obvious to any one in the
vicinity." The likelihood therefore that Cox's conduct in loading the truck without checking to see that it was properly
braked would result in injury to another if for any reason
whatever it broke loose was exceptionally high. The instrumentality being dealt with was a large heavy truck being made
heavier ton by ton by Cox. It is obvious to anyone that if such
an instrumentality were to run against a man or go over him,
the harm to him would be great and serious. "The seriousness
of the injury, if it happened" was tremendous and frightening
and anyone could see that it would be, if it happened. The
"interest which must be sacrificed to avoid the risk" was small
indeed. Cox needn't have gotten out of the scoopmobile. He
could have called to Hal Anderson to check his brakes and
block the wheels. This would have been no inconvenience
and would have sacrificed no interest. He could have gotten
out of the scoopmobile and tugged once on the brakes to test
them or told Hal Anderson to turn his wheels up hill. None
of these things would have required more than a moment or
two or much effort. There would have been little or no inconvenience or expense to Cox to exercise some additional
precaution under the facts of this case.

The defendants take the view that Cox was unfamiliar
with the truck's mechanism, that modern trucks are complicated and that the average person wouldn't know whether or
not it was braked. The defendants further assert on page 14 of
their brief that the emergency brake would have no effect
on the movement of the truck's rear wheels. Such contentions
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are not in accordance with the facts or with reason. There is
no evidence in the record that the emergency brake would not
operate if the vacuum leaked out of the Eaton two-speed rear
axle as contended by the defendant. Hal Anderson, in his
testimony (R-281), when asked about the emergency brake,
testified as follows:

"Q When you say you pulled the brakes on what
brake do you mean?
A The emergency brake.

Q How is that operated?
A Just with a lever.
There is some other evidence in the record with regard
to the ratchet on the brake of the truck; however, there was
no conclusive evidence from which the jury might have believed that the ratchet was defective. We submit that it is
wholly unreasonable to conclude that Clyde Cox, if he had
checked, would not have know whether the truck was properly
braked. On the contrary, there is some evidence in the record
from which the jury could have concluded that Cox did know
how to operate a truck. When being questioned by Mr.
Wooley with regard to the operation of the scoopmobile
(R-206), Mr. Cox testified as follows:

"Q. And operate it ( refering to the scoopmobile)
much like you do a truck ?
A: Yes, sir."
In applying James' analysis to th facts as they existed
m this case, we contend that a very substantial amount of
caution was required on the part of Cox in order to avoid
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having his conduct be such that it would involve an unreasonable risk of harm to. West. It is in the light of this very high
duty that the question whether Cox's acts or failure to act
constituted negligence must be considered.
The jury found that Cox was negligent by failing to
ascertain that the dump truck was so securely braked or blocked
that it would not run down hill. while being loaded. And they
found that that was a proximate cause of \Vest's injury. The
inquiry then must be whether or not Cox had any duty to
ascertain that the dump rtuck was securely braked so that it
would not run down hill while he was loading it. This question must in turn be examined in the light of whether or not
Cox is entitled, under circumstances of the case as they existed
at the time he started to load the truck, to rely upon the proposition that Hal Anderson had braked the truck properly and
that it would not run down hill. The defendants contend that
they had such right to rely and they base said contention primarily upon the proposition that if West, the plaintiff, was
entitled to assume that the truck was properly braked that
Cox is entitled to the same assumption. With regard to West's
right to rely we will _discuss that proposition at a later point
in the brief. We come to the portion of Mr. James' article
dealing with the obligation to take into account conditions and
conduct of others. The following is his discussion of the exact
point:
"E. The Obligation to Take Into Account the Conditions and the Conduct of Others.
When men live together in society, even the most
selfish of them must regulate their lives to a very
great extent on the basis of how they expect other
16
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people to act. And naturally enough in determining
whether any given conduct involves an unreasonable
risk of harm, the reasonably forseeable conduct of
others which may affect the consequences of the actor's
conduct should be considered. This is the general rule.
It remains to examine some special applications of it
and some vestigial limitations upon it in practice.
The case where the conduct of the other person
(i.e., other than the actor whose conduct is being
judged) is itself that of a normal, reasonably prudent
adult, gives no trouble at all. Such conduct the actor
is bound to take into account if under the circumstances
of the case it is reasonably foreseeable. Thus the manufacturer of an automobile in order to be in the exercise
of due care must foresee that it is likely to be driven
along public highways without the detection and repair
of a latent defect.
The obligation to regulate one's conduct with a
view to other people's disabilities and their substandard
conduct should stand no differently. People generally
do take extra precautions when they drive past a crowd
of young children playing by the roadside, or when
they see an aged and infirm pedestrian crossing the
street. They do realize that other drivers often pull out
from the curb without looking for traffic, and that they
sometimes fail to yield the right of way or keep on
going after a traffic light has turned red against them,
and they drive with a view to these hazards. They do
lock houses and automobiles and secure valuables
against the possibility of theft, and so on. There are
several types of situations where this notion has been
applied, and for mere convenience of treatment they
may be divided as follows:
1. Where something specific about the situation
gives notice of the likelihood of the other person's disability or his substandard conduct. The first two ex17
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amples given in the last paragraph are of that kind.
So also are those cases where the nature of the place
(e.g., playgrounds), or signs, proclaim the probability
that children or blind people, or the like, will be present. And of course the other person's conduct may often
show his infirmity to one who has eyes to see.
2. Where the actor's conduct (including omissions
and also such things as the maintenance of premises
or highways) is likely to affect an indeterminate number
of people, among whom there will in all probability
be some children, some aged and infirm people, some
pregnant woman, some foreigners who do not know
the language or the customs of the country, and the
like. In such situations, if the imputation of negligence
is to be avoided, some account must be taken of reasonably foreseeable deviations like those mentioned. But
such general likelihood does not call for as much in
the way of precautions as do the situations mentioned
in the previous paragraph.

When the other person's conduct involves negligence
or a crime, there are certain notions which sometimes
impede the full application of the foregoing rational
principle. It is often said that an actor may assume that
others will act lawfully and carefully. Rightly understood this is sound enough, and no more than a corollary
of the general principle. As a broad generalization,
people probably do obey the law, so that unlawful
conduct is more or less deviational and unusual. In
many situations, therefore, the assumption mentioned
no more than reflects the real factual probabilities
as to what another person's conduct will be. If the
assumption is made only in cases where it reflects the
facts, it is useful and proper. But in this connection two
things must be noted. The first is that such an assumption does not always correspond to the facts. It does
not in situations where a law is generally disobeyed.
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It does not where the facts in a specific case would
show to a reasonable man in the actor's position
that another person will probably disobey the law this
time. And it does not wherever the actor's conduct
exposes some interest to risk from a large and indeterminate group of people which will probably include
some who will be negligent or commit crime, so that
the likelihood of some negligence or some crime is
considerable, though the number of those who will
be responsible for it is relatively small. The second
thing to be noted is that the assumption has often
been applied rather mechanically, without any real
regard to the factual probabilities of the situation.
Perhaps the most siginficant trend that has taken place
in this particular field, in recent years, has been the
increasing liberalization in allowing the wrongs of other
people to be regarded as foreseeable where the facts
warrant that conclusion if they are looked at naturally
and not thorugh the lens of some artificial archaic
notion.
Subject to the qualifications just mentioned, situations
where the probable negligence or crime of another is
to be taken into account in evaluating conduct, fall into
classifications parallel to those mentioned above with
respect to the infirmities of others:
3. Where something specific about the situation gives
notice of the likelihood of the other person's probable
negligence or crime."
Prosser on Tarts, Hornbook Series, pages 243 to 249
inclusive, has a well-documented discussion relative to anticipating the conduct of others. The cases supporting the following propositions are referred to in the article and the following
extractions give the substance of the conclusions:

"There are many situations in which the hypothetical
reasonable man would be expected to anticipate and
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guard against the conduct of others. Anyone with
normal experience is required to have knowledge of
the traits and habits of common animals, and of other
human beings, and to govern himself accordingly. * * *
he is required to realize that there will be a certain
amount of negligence in the world. In general, where
the· risk is relatively slight, he is free to proceed upon
the assumption that other people will exercise proper
care * * * But when the risk becomes a serious one,
either because the threatened harm is great, or because
there is an especial likelihood that it will occur, reasonable care may demand precautions against that
occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and, therefore, to be anticipated."
To restrict the rule that one must contemplate the possibility of negligence on the part of a third person to a situation
where some act or that person puts the actor on notice of the
third person's disposition to be negligent, is to restrict the rule
improperly.
The static facts of a situation may, by themselves, be sufficient to give a reasonable man warning that he must con·
template the possibility of negligence on the part of others.

The trial court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 12
in part as follows:
"Clyde Cox as an employee owed Steve L. West
a duty to use reasonable care to avoid harming him.
That is to say, Clyde Cox was under an obligation to
conduct himself in reference to his business invitees
as a reasonably prudent man would do under the same
or similar circumstance."
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the early
case of Downey vs. Gemini Mining Co., (Utah) 24 P. 431, 68
P. 413, defined ordinary care as follows:
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"Ordinary care simply implies and includes the exercise of such reasonable diligence, care, skill, watchfulness, and forethought as, under all of the circumstances of the particular case a careful prudent man
or officer of a corporation would exercise under the
same or similar circumstances. And by the term 'same
circumstances' is meant to include all the circumstances
of time, place, and attendant conditions."
Again our Court reaffirms that the jury may consider more
than just the "acts of the third person."
38 Am fur. 667 Section 24, provides:
"The probability of injury by one to the legally protected interests of another is the basis for the law's
creation of a duty to avoid such injury. Every person
is under a duty to exercise his senses and intelligence
in his actions in order to avoid injury to others, and
where a situation suggests investigation and inspection
in order that its dangers may fully appear, the duty
to make such investigation and inspection is imposed
by law."
In the case at bar Cox was about to load a large truck
parked with wheels turned down hill on a hill. It had been
left there by a boy not quite 16 years of age who got out of
the truck after having left the wheels pointed down hill and
immediately left the truck to go down to talk to his brother.
Here, we submit, a reasonable man should be required to
contemplate that the truck might roll forward when it was
being loaded if it had been improperly braked. In view of
the seroiusness of the injury which would be caused were it
to roll forward, Cox could be held by a jury to have the affirmative duty to ascertain that the brakes were firmly set in

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

such a manner that the truck would not roll forward when
he commenced to load it.
The class of persons with whom one is dealing may be
sufficient in and of itself to put one on notice that some of
those persons may be negligent. The outstanding example
of this is a case where one is dealing with children. One must
contemplate that children may act without any care for their
own safety. Similarly we contend that Cox was required to
contemplate the possibility that a sixteen year old boy might
not act with the amount of caution which an ordinary prudent
grown man would use under the circumstances there attendant.
The acts of third persons are a third class of cases which
would put a reasonable prudent man upon notice that the third
person might be negligent. Such acts as leaving a truck unattended and turning the wheels down hill toward the plaintiff
when it is parked on a hill are such acts which a jury could
properly find to be sufficient to put a reasonable man upon
notice that the person doing those acts might be negligent.
The Restatement of the Law of Torts deals with the rule
in situations such as those present in this case. The following
are portions of the Restatement, paragraph by paragraph,
with the facts applied to the situation which are sufficient to
support the jury's findings and the judgment entered upon it.
Restatement, Torts, Sec. 302:
"i. Action of human beings. Whether the actor as a
reasonable man is entitled to expect that human beings
will exercise the amount of attention, foresight, care,
and skill which persons of their class customarily exercise in similar conditions depends upon a variety of
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factors. If the actor knows or should know that the
safety of the situation which he has created depends
upon the actions of a particular person or a particular
class of persons, he is required to take into account their
peculiar characteristics of inattention, carelessness, unskillfulness, or even recklessness if he knows or should
know thereof."
Cox knew or should have known that the safety of the
situation with which he was dealing depended upon the actions
of Hal Anderson. The situation which Cox created was the
application of active force tending to push the truck down
hill where the truck was standing unattended on a hill ·with the
wheels pointed in a downhill direction toward the plaintiff.
He certainly knew or would be required to know that the
safety of the situation thus created depended entirely upon
whether or not Hal Anderson had behaved with every reasonable care. Under the circumstances he, under the rules stated
above, is required to take into account the particular characteristics of inattention, carelessness, or unskillfulness of the
third person if he knows or should know thereof. Cox knew
of Hal's inattention because he saw that Hal had left the
truck and was paying no attention whatever to it. He knew
or should have known that Hal was careless because he saw
or should have seen that Hal had left the wheels on the truck
turned in a downhill direction. He knew or should have known
that Hal Anderson may be unskilled because he knew or could
see that Hal was a young man of approximately 16 years of age.

Restatement, Torts,· Section 302:

"j. Irrespective of the actor's knowledge of the peculiar propensities of particular persons or classes of
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persons, he is required to know that there is a certain
p~rcentage of all human beings which acts with less
than normal propriety. Unless the interest at stake is
valuable, the actor may be entitled to ignore the slight
risk of harm to others involved in such propensities
and to assume that human beings will act with normal
propriety. If the actor knows or should realize that the
situation is one which, if improperly interfered with,
involves serious chance of grave harm to valuable interests of others, he is required to take this chance into
account and provide against it, particularly if his conduct is of little or no utility."
The above comment should be analyzed with the realization that the "interest at stake" is of tremendous value. The
interest being the life and limb of Steven West, because certainly ~nder the situation as seen by Cox, the person whose
interest stood in the greatest peril was Steve West and the
interest which stood in that peril was his life. Certainly Cox
knew or should realize that the situation there present was
one which, if improperly interferred with, involves serious
chance of grave harm to valuable interest of others. It is true
that the conduct of C6x in loading the truck was conduct having substantial utility but offset against the substantial utility
is the consideration that it would have taken so little time
and so little effort to have done the things which would have
made the situation safe.
Restatement, Torts, Section 302:
"1. Anticipation of third person's negligence. The
actor is often required to anticipate and provide against
that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary
incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated,
particularly if there is little or no utility in the creation
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of the situation and the harm likely to be done is·
something more than trivial."
The defendants cite Restatement of the Law of Torts, Negligence, Section (e) page 17, in support of their proposition
that the defendant Cox had no duty to anticipate that the truck
might roll down hill. Properly analyzed this rule is applicable
to the case at bar but does not support the plaintiff's proposition. It sets forth the rule that an actor is entitled to assume
that human beings and animals will act and that natural forces
will operate in their usual manner. This portion of the rule
is not applicable, however, if, first, the actor had reason to
expect the contrary or, secondly, that the action would create
a serious chance of grave harm to same valuable interest, i.e., the
life of Steve West, and there is little utility in the actor's conduct such as the ease of checking the brakes. Referring to the
first exception, i.e., where the actor has reason to expect to
the contrary, we submit, that under Instruction 9 (a) as it was
given to the jury, they must have come to the conclusion that
some act on the part of Hal Anderson put Cox on notice to
the contrary and that he might act in a negligent manner.
The defendants cite the case of Hilliard vs. Utah ByProducts. Company (Utah) 1 2nd 287, 263 Pac. 2nd 287, as
being particularly applicable to the evidence in this case, not
only as to whether Cox should have foreseen the negligent
conduct on the part of Hal Anderson in parking the truck
but also his duty to foresee that the plaintiff would not exercise
reasonable care for his own safety. The Hilliard case is not
in point on the facts. It involves the foreseeability of an intervening actor. That case might throw some light on the
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duty and foreseeability with regard to Hal Anderson, however, that matter is not involved in this appeal.
The case of Mehl vs. Carter, (Kan.) 237 Pac. 2nd 240,
cited by the defendants with regard to the question of foreseeability, cannot be in point in this case. The facts are entirely
different and shed no light upon the problem to be determined
with regard to the question of foreseeability.
We must determine as to whether or not it is necessary
that Cox be given specific notice of the exact manner in which
the accident may take place. It is not required that one foresee
the exact manner in which harm actually comes to the person
injured. The test of foreseeability is that the person harmed
may be within the general class to whom such harm is threatened and that the harm which results be of the general class
of harm which may be expected to result. The sequence of'"
events by virtue of which the harm results need not be foreseeable. This is set out by Harper in 7 Notre Dame Law Review
468 in his article "Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Torts"
as follows:
"The courts for centuries persisted in stating and
purporting to apply the 'natural and the probable'
formula to determine whether consequences were proximate to conduct. Many still insist that there can be no
recovery if the injuries complained of were not reasonably foreseeable. It would be most astonishing
that such a formula should persist for so long if there
were no validity whatever to it. The secret is revealed
by the frequent qualification of the rule that the exact
manner in which he injuries occurred need not be foreseeable. The explanation is that the courts are perfectly
accurate in declaring that there can be no liability where
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the injuries were unforeseeable, if 'foreseeability' re·
fers to the general type of harm sustained. It is perfectly
true that there is no liability for in juries or damage that
falls entirely outside the general threat of harm which
made the conduct of the actor negligent. The sequence
of events, of course, need not be foreseeable. The
manner in which the risk culminates in harm may be
unusual, improbable, and highly unexpectable, from
the point of view of the actor, at the time of his conduct. And yet, if the general result suffered falls within
the danger area, there may be liability, providing to
other requisites of legal causation are present.
It should be observed that while non-liability for
harm is completely outside the general threat is a
correct statement of the results, to catch the rule in
terms of legal causation is not a desirable analysis of
he problem. It is rather a lack of analysis. Legal causation is better confined solely to the problem presented
by the sequence of events leading up to the injury.
Where the actor's liability is predicated upon his negligent conduct, the question of whether the harm sustained falls within or outside the general class of harms
which made the conduct negligent may be treated
more conveniently as an aspect of the negligence
problem, and it has been so treated by the American
Law Institute in its Restatement of Negligence."
The defendants contend that in the two years Clyde Cox
had been loading coal that this was the first time that a truck
had ever moved from its moorings and rolled down a hill
and that therefore the defendant had no duty to anticipate
and foresee that such would be the case. There is no evidence in the record that Cox had ever loaded a truck under
the same circumstances as he did in the instant case. It takes
no great amount of insight to foresee that a truck loaded
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under these circumstances might run away
driven by anyone could result in great harm.
sult suffered in this case, i.e.: the injuries to
submit, falls within the danger area and was
seeable.

and not being
The general reSteve West, we
reasonably fore-

The Supreme Court of the State of Texas, in the case of
Humble Oil & Refining Company, et al vs. Martinet al (Texas)
222 S. W. 2nd 995, considered a factual situation almost on all
fours with the case at bar. In that case the petitioner Humble
operated a filling station which was located on an incline of
about 6 inches per 27 feet. The owner of the automobile, a
Mrs. Love, parked her car in the service station to obtain
service by Humble and with the latter's actual knowledge and
consent and left the car unattended on a sloping drive. The
court held Humble to be liable to persons who were injured
when the car rolled down the drive. The court held in part as
follows:
"It seems proper that the operator of a filling station
should owe to that part of the public which might be
affected-such as resopndent Martin here-the duty
of ordinary care to prevent cars left with it under such
circumstances from rolling away and injuring persons
or property. If there were any doubt about this in the
ordinary case, there could hardly be any in a situation
like the present, in which both the possibility of such
an accident and the probability of serious results therefrom were obvious. If, to take an extreme example,
the station employee, Manis, had been otherwise unoccupied and standing close by Mrs. Love's car in a
position where he could readily and with safety to
himself have stopped it but, after seeing it start, had
yet made no effort to stop it, there could be little doubt
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that such conduct would constitute actionable negligence on Humble's part toward the publiC. Similarly,
if Mrs. Love had been a stranger visiting the station
for the first time and with the previous knowledge of
the station employees, had left her car unoccupied
and unbraked beside the pumps, so that it later rolled
away, it seems plain that Humble ought to be responsible for the consequences to innocent third persons.
These examples illustrate the existence of the duty of
the station operator to the public and also the corollary
proposition that the operator is not free to omit precaution or effort simply because the particular car
in question is brought onto the premises by its owner
or happens to escape before the station operator has
taken physical control of it. They do not, however,
throw much light on the problem of the quantum of
care or precaution necessary to meet the standard of
reasonable prudence.
As to the latter question, undoubtedly the peculiar
physical characteristic of the station, all of which must
be taken as a matter of law to be well known to
Humble, have a legitimate bearing, and as a result,
we think the amount of care should plainly be greater
than, for example, in the case of a station located in
a flat area and without sloping driveways. Should
authority be needed to support such a conclusion, it
has been held in Texas and elsewhere that, under the
so-called rule of res ipsa loquitur, evidence that a
defendant's car was parked by him in a heavily sloping
street and thereafter rolled down without a driver,
damaging the plaintiff's person or property, was sufficient to carry the case to the jury on the issue of the
defendant's negligence, even though the only other
evidence on the point was direct evidence by the defendant or others that the emergency brake was carefully set at the time the car was parked. Ketchum v.
Gillespie, Tex. Civ. App., 145 S. W. 2nd 215; Glaser v.
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Schroeder, 269 Mass. 337, 168 N. E. 809. While we
do not consider the present care one of res ipsa loquitur
or other rule of circumstantial evidence in so far as
the liability of petitioner Humble is concerned, the
decisions mentioned do necessarily imply that the
matter of leaving a car on a sloping way is one in which
the ordinarily prudent man would be expected to take
a greater amount of precaution than otherwise. Assuming that in the instant case the station employee,
Manis, were unoccupied at the time Mrs. Love left her
car in the pump area, knew she had herself taken no
precautions to keep the car stationary and yet stood
idly by in his office for even two or three minutes, we
think there would be a serious question as to whether
Humble would not be gulty of negligence as a matter
of law. This, because his knowledg_e would, by all
reasonable standards, call for quicker action than might
otherwise be required. The only differences between
such a situation and the instant case are, first, that in
the latter Manis might conceivably have been justified
in relying on Mrs. Love herself to take the necessary
precautions; and, secondly, that Manis was evidently
occupied with servicing another car at the pumps and
other successive duties from the time Mrs. Love left
her car until it rolled away.
As to the first difference, while Mrs. Love was a
regular customer of the station, understood the necessity
of securing her car and was negligent in failing to
secure it, we cannot say that as a matter of law, Manis

exercised sufficient care in the discharge of his duty
to the public by simply assuming she had secured it.
A plaintiff injured when standing close to a public
street without keeping a lookout, is not, as a matter
of law, to be acquitted of contributory negligence because he assumes that the defendant's oncoming car
will be driven with due care and will therefore not
strike him. Cronk v. ]. G. Pegues Motor Co., Tex. Civ.
3-0
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App., 167 S. W. 2d 254, writ ref. w. o. m. And there
is distinction between the general axiom that a person
is not bound to anticipate the negligence of others
and the idea that one may always discharge a duty
of due care to the public by relying on performance
by another of the same duty owed by the latter. Mrs.
Love did not indicate to Manis that she had secured
or intended to secure the car, and we think any implied
reliance by him upon her doing so was merely a circumstance to be considered by the jury on the issue
of negligence.
Nor can we say, as a matter of law, that the circumstance of Manis being busy with other matters at the
time shows him to have discharged his duty of due
care. It was clearly not very difficult for him to have
interrupted his other work for the brief time an inspection would require. The jury might well have
thought it a more urgent matter to make this inspection
than to collect for· soft drinks purchased by customers,
or do several other things he appears to have done before the car rolled away. Plainly any unfavorable
consequences of interrupting these latter duties would
be less serious than those of a failure to inspect an
unguarded car. As to the matter of just how much
time elapsed between the moment Mrs. Love left her
car and the moment it rolled away, while the preponderance of the evidence does indicate that this period
was rather short, we cannot say as a matter of law
that it was only "two or three minutes" as testified to
by Manis. His estimate was at best an estimate and,
coming from him as an employee of the defendant
Humble and one who might himself be responsible
in the premises, need not be taken as conclusive, while
at the same time there is at least some evidence from
the various other winesss indicating that a considerably
greater period of time might have elapsed. In any
event the period is itself not conclusive one way or the
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other. If with his knowledge that the car was left on
the sloping lane, it- was reasonable for Manis to forego
an inspection for two or three minutes, it was doubtless reasonable for him to do so for a still longer time.
On the· other hand, we think the jury might properly
have considered even two or three minutes too long
a delay under the circumstances. The point was merely
evidentiary and no more the proper subject of a special
issue than, for example, the question of just what other
duties Manis was in fact performing during the period.
Other contentions (by .both petitioners) stem from
an apparent confusion in the jury findings to the effect
that, while Mrs. Love negligently failed to set the
emergency brake (she admitted failing to set it), she
nevertheless did "properly place the gears of her car
in reverse" (as she--and she alone--testified) when
she left it. The jury also found upon sufficient evidence
that the gears were not in defective condition. An apparently impartial witness testified rather convincingly
that when he examined the car immediately after it
stopped in respondent Martin's yard, the gear was in
the neutral position. The evidence does not admit of
any theory of the accident such as the meddling of a
third party or the intervention of any force other than
gravity. If the car were left in reverse gear, it seems
clear that neither Humble nor Mrs. Love would be
liable. It is common knowledge that such a procedure
is quite as safe a method of securing a car as setting
the emergency brake, and that cars in reverse gear do
not roll on grades such as that prevailing at and even
beyond the place where the Love car undoubtedly was
left. Mrs. Love could not be negligent if she took an
obviously sufficient precaution, and if she did take it,
the failure of Humble to inspect was not the proximate
cause of the accident, nor was its failure to take other
precautions negligence. The Court of Civil Appeals
considered that, under the circumstances, the finding
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that the car was left in reverse was "almost incredible."
Without the least reflection upon the good faith of
Mrs. Love, we more than agree with this view and
think this Co~ut is not bound by the finding or Mrs.
Love's statement, which is its only support, her testimony being in our judgment at variance with elemental physical facts and common knowledge and so not
evidence, regardless of the good faith of the witness.
Seilwell v. Hines, 273 Pa. 259, 116 A, 919, 21 A.L.R.
139; Austin v. Neiman, Tex. Com. App., 14 S. W. 2d
794, 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 1183. This conclusion
disposes of the only serious contention of petitioner
Humble with respect to its negligence not being a pmximate cause of the accident." (Underli?ing added.)
The parallel between the factual situation in the Humble
case and the case at bar is noteworthy. In the Humble case
Mrs. Love had come to purchase gasoline; in the case at bar,
Hal Anderson was present on the premises as an independent
contractor of the Eastern Utah Development Company to
purchase coal from McKinnon doing business as the American Fuel Company. In both cases the motor vehicle ran
down a hill after it was left unattended by the driver of
the motor vehicle. In the Humble case the service station
opertaor knew that Mrs. Love had left the automobile there
and had apparently consented thereto. In the case at bar,
Cox saw Hal Anderson leave the truck and made no protest
but proceeded to load the truck. In the Humble case the car
escaped before the station operator had taken physical control of it. In the case at bar, there is even a stronger indication
that Cox had some duty because he was interfering with the
truck by loading large loads of coal into the body of the truck.
In the Humble case, the Humble Oil Company contended that
~3
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their employee Manis had a right to rely upon the fact that
Mrs. Love had secured the automobile. Here Cox contends
he is entitled to rely upon the fact that Hal Anderson had
secured the truck. The jury in the Humble case found that Mrs.
Love had left the car in gear; however, the Court of Appeals
considered that under the circumstances such finding was
almost incredible and was at variance with elemental physical
facts. In the case at bar, the jury found that Hal Anderson
was negligent in failing to set the brakes securely on the dump
truck. In both cases· the defendants contended that any act
done by them was not the proximate cause of the accident.
The only possible distinction between the two cases is the
question of custody and control of the motor vehicles. However,
if such distinction makes any difference we submit that the
defendant Cox cannot make such a claim.
The issues were submitted to the jury on special interrogatories pursuant to Rule 49 (a) U.R.C.P. The defendant did
not ask that the issue as to control of the truck be submitted
to the jury, and the Court omitted such issue of fact. The rule
provides in part:
''The court shall give to the jury such explanation
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted
as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence,
each party waives his right to trial by jury of the issue
so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its
submission to the jury.
As to the issue of control the court made no finding, however, the rule further provides:
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"As to an issue omitted without such demand the
court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it
shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with
the judgment on a special verdict."
In view of this rule, we submit that the court has found
that Cox was in control and custody of the truck at the time
that he commenced to load it, and this is based upon the fact
that Hal Anderson had left the truck unattended and nobody
else was in the area. The reasoning of the Texas Supreme
Court, in the Humble case alone, is sufficient to sustain the
finding of the jury that Cox was negligent.
A Utah case throwing light on this general area and
holding the problem of negligence and cause to be for the
jury where the question is whether one must anticipate that
others may be negligent is Shafer vs. Keeley Ice Cream Co.,
65 U. 46, 234 P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523.
The precise question is whether the court may say as a
matter of law that Cox was not negligent, under all of the
circumstances present, in loading without checking the brakes
or whether it is a questoin to be left to the jury. The rule is
stated generally in the recent case of Best vs. Huber (Utah),
281 Pac. 2nd 208, as follows:
"It has been frequently announced by this court
that negligence is a question for the jury unless all
reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from
the facts as they are shown. Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream
Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523; Lowe
v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 708; Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P.2d
679. As was said in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20
Utah 134, 58 P. 355, '3~58:
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" 'Where there is uncertainty as to the existence of
either negligence or contributory negligence, the question is not one of law, but of fact, and to be settled
by a jury; and this whether, the uncertainty arises from
a conflict in the testimony, or because, the facts being
undisputed, fair-minded men will honestly draw different conclusoins from them.' "
In discussing the general rule that a person has a right
to presume that every other person will perform his duty,
the Supreme Court of the State of California, in the case of
Dickinson vs. Pacific Greyhound Lines (Calif) 131 Pac. (2nd)
401, at page 403 held:
"Whether reasonable care is used under the circumstances in any particular case in relying upon the
presumption, is a question for the jury."
It appears to us that under the circumstances present
in this case, the jury may well hold that a reasonably prudent
man would not have relied upon Hal Anderson's being free
from negligence but would instead, being alerted by the unusual circumstances present and by the tender age of Anderson,
take some additional precautions such as blocking or braking
the truck. This is what they did in fact hold.
When it is seen that the true rule is not that "one has an
absolute right to rely upon the freedom from negligence of
another until some affirmative act upon the other's part gives
him specific notice that the other person is not doing the thing
which he should," but instead, the same old rule that one must
behave as a reasonable man would under the circumstances,
it is apparent the jury's verdict can be sustained and that the
judgment entered upon it is proper. Whether these facts were
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sufficient to give a reasonable man notice is p~rely a question
for the jury. If there is in fact a fair, proper and lawful
theory sustaining the verdict and the judgment, it is the duty
of the court to allow the verdict to stand as given and not to
disturb the judgment entered upon it. There is such a proper
theory sustaining the verdict and the judgment. In view of
this, the court should allow the verdict and judgment to stand.
In their argument in Point I the defendants finally contend that any act of Clyde Cox was twice removed from the
injury to the plaintiff. They state: "Not only do we have the
intervening negligence of the defendant Hal Anderson, but
we have the conduct of the plaintiff * * * ."
We do not believe that the defendants seriously contend
that the negligence of Hal Anderson was an intervening cause.
The defendant Cox cannot excuse his negligence because
of the negligence of Hal Anderson. The negligence of Hal
Anderson and of Clyde Cox were concurrent causes. The
test in determining whether or not it is a concurrence of causes
is simply: could the accident have happened without their
cooperation? See Sherman and Redfield on Negligence, Vol.
1, Sec. 39, page 106. In his case if either Hal Anderson had
put on the brakes or if Clyde Cox had not loaded the truck
without checking the brakes the accident would not have
happened.
The Restatement of Torts, Section 452, discusses the problem of a third person's failure to prevent harm. Comment
(a) states:
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"The fact that the third person has failed to perform
his duty to protect the other from harm threatened
by the actor's negligence, implies that had the duty
been performed, it would have prevented the actor's
negligence from causing the harm which resulted from
it. In order that there can be a failure of a duty of
protection the person owing it must have either the
opportunity to p~erform it or at least he should have
had an opportunity had he been reasonably attentive
to his surroundings. The third person's failure to perform his duty in this respect makes him concurrently
liable with the negligent actor for any harm which
results from the actor's negligence which would have
have been prevented by the third person's duty."
The law is well settled in Utah that a defendant is not
relieved from liability merely because some other cause operated
with the negligence of the defendant to produce the injury.
Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company vs. Cudahy
Packing Company, 61 Utah 116, 211 Pac. 706; United States
vs. First Security Bank of Utah, 208 Fed. (2nd) 424; Caperon
vs. Tuttle, 100 Utah 476, 116 Pac. (2nd) 402.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington followed
the same rule in the case of Seibly vs. City of Sunnyside,
(Wash) 35 Pac. (2nd) 56.
The Supreme Court of the State of California in the case
of Taylor vs. Oakland Scavanger Co. (Calif) 100 Pac. (2nd)
1044, states the Rule as follows:

"If an injury is produced by the concurrent effect
of two separate wrongful acts, each is a proximate
cause of the injury, and either can operate as an efficient intervening cause with regard to the other. * * *
The fact that neither party could reasonably anticipate
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the concurrence of the other concurrent cause will not
shield him from liability so long as his own negligence
was one of the causes of the in jury." (Citing cases.)
The defendants base their argument with regard to the
negligence of Clyde Cox and also as to the contributory negligence of Steven West upon the proposition "that if Steven
West could assume that the truck was securely braked that
Clyde Cox was entitled to the same assumption. The defendants cite no case to support this theory and we find none.
However, we will discuss the question in connection with the
next point.

POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF, STEVEN WEST, WAS NOT GUlLTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN SITTING DOWN BY THE SIDE OF THE MAIN
TRAVELED WAY ON A PILE OF COAL WITHOUT BEING ATTENTIVE MERELY BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND
CLYDE COX GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE, BECAUSE, THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ACTS AND
FAILURE TO ACT OF COX AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE ACTS OF WEST WERE ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT.
The defendants base their argument with regard to the
contributory negligence of Steven West primarily upon the
proposition that Steven West and Clyde Cox were aware of the
same situation. In defendants' brief (page 22) or as stated
in defendant's brief page '3•2.
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"Therefore they are saying what should have been
apparent to the defendants as reasonable and prudent
men should not have been apparent to the plaintiff
under the same circumstances as a reasonable and prudent man."
Then basing their reasoning upon this premise conclude:
"that if under these circumstances Cox was negligent, then West must have also been contributorily
negligent as a matter of law." (Page 33 defendants'
brief.)
We submit that there can be merit to defendants' argument if, but only if, the facts of the case were such that the
circumstances are the same and are equally apparent to both.
That is not true in this case. There was a similarity of situation
only up to the point where Hal Anderson got out of the truck.
Cox directed Anderson to park the truck as he did and West
heard the truck backing in. Beyond that point West's negligence, if any, was inattentiveness. He testified that he did not
know what was going on. The evidence is clear that his hat
was down over his eyes and he was inattentive. However,
as to Cox, he saw Hal Anderson leave the truck and go down
to talk to his brother. Further, he was in a position where he
could see that Hal Anderson had left the wheels turned in a
downhill position. He knew that Hal Anderson was the driver
of the truck and was a young man-an apparent youth: Cox
knew of the position of the truck and its relation to the grade.
None of these things were known to West inasmuch as he
was, in fact, inattentive. The only issue which was submitted
to the jury with regard to the negligence of Steve West was
question No. 3, and that was whether or not West was negli40
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gent m occupying the pos1t10n where he was injured. The
only contention made by the defendants in the pleadings or
pretrial order as finally decided upon, was that
"The plaintiff was himself guilty of contributory
negligence which proximately contributed to cause his
injuries and damages in that the said plaintiff seated
himself in an inattentive position downhill and slightly
to the left of and in front of the truck being loaded."
(R-43).
Thus, we submit, the contributory negligence, if any, of
Steven West must be considered with regard to the situation
as it existed as to him and not with regard to the situation
as it existed to Clyde Cox. The defendants cite the Restatement
of the Law of Torts, Sec. 340, Page 927, and a number of cases
which stand for the general proposition that as stated in the
Restatement of the Law of Torts:
"A possessor of land is not subject to liability to his
licencees, whether business visitors or gratuitous licensees, for bodily harm caused to them by any dangerous condition thereon, whether natural or artificiaf, if
they know of the condition and realize the risk involved
therein."
In the case of Hooton, et al, vs. City of Burley, (Idaho)
219 Pac. (2nd) 651, cited by the defendants as particularly
applicable to this case, the defendant had left some bare
electrical wires. The plaintiff saw the wires flashing and was
cognizant of the danger involved. The case merely announces
the general rule that where a plaintiff voluntarily exposes
himself to a danger he is precluded from recovery. The case
of Murray vs. Ralph R'Oench Co., (Mo.) 147 S.W. 2nd 623,
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13 Negligence Cases, 638 involves a wet spot on a floor which
plaintiff testified she saw and was pointed out to her on her
entrance to the premises. Kitchen vs. Women's City Club
(Mass.} 66 N.E. 554, involved a situation where the plaintiff
slipped on a highly polished qardwood floor. As stated in
the case:
"The plaintiff knew all the conditions of which she
complains, she knew that light rugs when stepped on
may be expected to slip on slippery floors."
In the case of Wold vs. Ogden City, et al (Utah) 258,
P 2nd 453, the court emphasized the fact that the plaintiff
knew of the hazard, an open trench. The rules announced in
these cases, we submit, are not helpful in deciding the issues
involved in this case. Each involves a situation where the
plaintiff assumed the risk of a known danger. The defendants
cite two other cases: Scofield vs. Sprouse-Reitz Company,
(Utah) 265 Pac. (2nd) 396, and Knox vs. Snow (Utah) 229
P. 2nd 874. Each of these cases involved a situation where the
plaintiff falls into an easily observable hazard. These cases
we submit have no application here.
Restatement of the Law of Torts Sec. 466 recognizes two
types of contributory negligence. The section states:

"The plaintiff's contributory negligence may be
either
(a) an intentional and unreasonable exposure of
himself to danger created by the defendant's negligence, of which danger the plaintiff knows or has reason
to know, or
(b) conduct which, in respects other than those stated
in Clause (a), fall short of the standard to which the
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reasonable man should conform in order to protect
himself from harm.
Comment (c) under said section discusses the type of
negligence in clause (a) as follows:
"In order that the plaintiff's conduct may be contributory negligence of the sort described in Clause (a),
the plaintiff must know of the physical condition created
by the defendant's negligence and must have knowledge of such facts that, as a reasonable man, he should
realize the danger involved. Furthermore, the plaintiff
must intentionally expose himself to this danger. He
must have the purpose to place himself within reach
of it. It is not enough that his failure to exercise reasonable attention to his surroundings prevents him
from observing the danger, or that lack of reasonable
preparation or competence prevents him from avoiding
it when the condition created by the defendant is
known to him."
Comment (g) under said section discusses the type of
negligence described in clause (b) as follows:
"The negligence dealt with in Clause (b) usually
consists of plaintiff's failure to pay reasonable attention
to his surroundings so as to discover the danger created
by the defendant's negligence or to exercise reasonable
competence, care, diligence, and skill to avoid the
danger when it is perceived, or to make such preparations as a reasonable man would regard as necessary
to enable him to avoid the possible future danger. Such
negligence is negligence of inadvertance and will, for
convenience, be hereinafter described as casual negligence to distinguish it from the type of negligence
dealt with in Clause (a) which is herein called assumption of risk and consists in the plaintiff's voluntary
and unreasonable exposure of himself to a known
danger."
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The law an_d cases cited by the defendants under Point II
involve the type of negligence discussed in Clause (a). The
negligence of Steve West, if any, can only be negligence of
inadvertence as discussed in Clause (b). At the time Steve
West assumed the position that he did no danger existed.
Furthermore, the only evidence in the record with regard to
the custom as to where men would sit while waiting to be
loaded was to the effect that they sat wherever they felt like
and on other occasions had been observed to sit in the same
place or the same vicinity where Steve West was sitting when
he was injured (R-325). Also the same day that West was
in jured Cox testified he saw other men at the same place as
Steve West (R-185).
There is no evidence in the record to show that Steve
West had any reason to apprehend any danger and we submit
therefore that he cannot be found guilty of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming in the case
of VanHorn vs. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission (Wyo)
92 Pac. (2nd) 560, 562, states this principal as follows:
"Here we think the more pertinent principal applicable is as held in Chicago Telephone Company vs.
Commercial Union Assurance Company, Ltd., of London, 131 Ill. App. 248, that the doctrine of contributory negligence does not apply where it appears that
the omission or conduct alleged to constitute contributory negligence was in the doing or the not doing of
some act or acts in relation to a danger not reasonably
to have been apprehended. In the opinion in that case
the decision in Ingall vs. Smith, 82 Mich. 1, 7, 46 N.W.
21, was quoted to this effect: 'It is a sound rule of law
that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for
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danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.'
Beach Contrib. Neg. 41."
The jury under special interrogatory found that Steven
L. West was not guilty of negligence in assuming the position
he did. This finding under the facts and circumstances of
this case we submit should not be disturbed by the court upon
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the
rule that contributory negligence is generally a question of
fact for the jury. In the case of Hone vs. Mammoth Mining
Company, (Utah) 27 U. 168, 176, the court held as follows:
"This court held in Holland vs. Oregon Shortline
Railway Company, 26 Utah 209, 212, 72 P. 940, that
'contributory negligence is a question of law only when
the testimony is not conflicting, and is such as permits
no reasonable difference of opinion as to its effect; but,
whenever there is doubt as to the facts, it is the province
of the jury to determine the question, or, whenever
there may reasonably be a difference of opinion as to the
inference and conclusions from the facts, it is likewise
a question for the jury. It belongs to the jury not only
to weigh the evidence and find upon the questions of
fact, but to draw conclusions as well, alike from disputed and undisputed facts.''
"This court, in the case of Linder vs. Anchor Mining
Company, 20 Utah 134, 148, 58 Pac. 355, 358, held in
the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice McCarty, that: 'It
is well settled that, where there is uncertainty as to the
existence of either negligence or contributory negligence, the question is not one of law but of fact, and to
be settled by a jury; and this whether the uncertainty
arises from a conflict in the testimony, or, because the
facts being undisputed, fair minded men will honestly
draw different conclusions from them."
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In view of the fact, that in this case there was no apparent
danger to Steven West and that at the time he assumed the
position he did there was no activity whatever, reasonable
minds might differ as to whether or not he was contributorily
negligent in assuming the position he did and remaining inattentive to what was going on. The question was properly
submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court of Utah in the case
of Martin vs. Stevens (Utah), 243 Pac. (2nd) 747, at page
749 states the rule as follows:
"The question of contributory negligence is usually
for the jury and the court should be reluctant to take
consideration of this question of fact from it. Neilson
vs. Mauchley, Utah 202 P. 2nd 547; Toomers Estate
vs. Union Pacific Railway Co., (Utah) 239 P 2d 163,
The expressions in those cases are in accord with this
uniformly accepted doctrine. The right to trial by jury
should be safeguarded. Before the issue of contributory
negligence may be taken from the jury, the defendant's
burden of proving both (a) that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence, and (b) that such negligence
proximately contributed to cause his own injury, must
be met, and established with such certainty that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary; conversely,
if there is any reasonable basis, either because of lack
of evidence, or from the evidence and the fair inferences
arising therefrom, taken in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, upon which reasonable minds may
conclude that they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence rather (a) that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence or (b) that such
negligence proximately contributed to the cause of
the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question
submitted to the jury."
The defendants finally contend that as a matter of law
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under the evidence neither the defendant, Cox nor the plaintiff, West, were negligent in failing to anticipate Hal Anderson's negligence. With this proprosition we agree in part.
Failure to anticipate negligence of another which results in
an injury, is not contributory negligence and will not defeat
the action. McCulloch vs. Horton (Mont.), 56 Pac. (2nd)
1344. However, this is not the negligence involved in this
case. The jury found Cox negligent in failing to ascertain
that the brakes on the truck were applied before he started
to load the truck and that this was a proximate cause of the
accident. They found that Steve West was not negligent in
assuming the position he did and remaining inattentive. We
submit, therefore, that because the jury found Cox guilty of
negligence it does not follow that West was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

POINT III
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT
DO N 0 T OVER-ACCENTUATE THE PLAINTIFF'S
THEORY, BECAUSE, SUCH INSTRUCTIONS WERE
GIVEN TO ENABLE THE JURY TO ANSWER THE
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SUBMITTED TO THEM.
Under Point III in defendants' brief, the defendants have
discussed a number of contentions wherein they claim the
court erred in its instructions and for convenience we have
broken this point down into four points and will discuss them
in the same order as discussed in defendants' brief.
47
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The defendants contend that the court instructions placed
undue emphasis on the plaintiff's theory of the case and did
not give equal emphasis to the theory of the defendants. The
instructions in this case must be considered in light of the
fact that the issues were submitted to the jury on special
interrogatories. Rule 49 (a) U.R.C.P., provides in part as
follows:
"The court shall give to the jury such explanation
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted
as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue."
Professor James William Moore in Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5, Page 2207, in discussing the instruction of a jury
under a special verdict states as follows:
"Use of the special verdict eliminates the necessity
for and use of complicated instructions on the law,
which are a normal concomitant of the general verdict.
Complicated instructions have always been ludicrous
and vicious; ludicrous in that only the naive can believe lay juries are capable of absorbing all the legal
elements involved; vicious in that lack of comprehension leads to confusion and ultimately, injustice. When
the special verdict is used the court should give to the
jury only such explanation and instructions as it deems
necessary to enable the jury to make intelligent findings upon the issues of facts submitted."
The instructions given with regard to Hal Anderson's
negligence i.e. Instructions 10 and 11 cited by the plaintiff in
support of their theory that the court over-emphasized the
plaintiff's theory of the case were necessarily given in order
to enable th jury to make their findings with regard to the
48
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

negligence of Hal Anderson. The defendants do not claim
that they are erroneous in stating the law but merely that they
over-emphasized the duty of the defendants and particularly
that they over-emphasized the duty of Clyde Cox. Such contention, we submit, is without merit. The court must of necessity instruct the jury with regard to each of the special interrogatories submitted. The defendants cite the case of Devine
vs. Cook, 279 Pac. (2d) 1073, in support of their theory that
the court in this case over emphasized or over accentuated
the plaintiff's theory of the case. However, an analysis of this
case and the other cases therein cited indicates that the over
accentuation discussed in those cases is the giving of multiple
and complicated instructions on the same subject. Such was
not done in this case.
The defendants further claim and cite Divine vs. Cook,
supra, as authority that it is error to have the instruction pertaining to one party to be given in a positive manner and those
pertaining to another given in a negative manner. This proposition, we also submit, is not applicable to the case at bar.
Instruction No. 12 with regard to the duty of Clyde Cox
merely places upon Clyde Cox a duty to use reasonable care
to avoid harming Steve West and that he was obligated to
conduct himself as a reasonably prudent man. Paragraph two
of the Instruction merely sets forth the conditions which the
jury was entitled to consider under the evidence in determining whether or not Clyde Cox did act as a reasonably prudent
man. There is no positive instruction that if Clyde Cox did
not check the brakes he would be guilty of negligence. This
fact was left for the determination of the jury under an m-
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struction which we claim to be proper. On the other hand Instruction No. 13 with regard to the contributory negligence
of Steve West states in a postive manner that Steven L. West
would be guilty of negligence in assuming the position he did
without keeping an outlook for his own safety. The defendants
complain of this last phrase, however, the evidence was undisputed that he did not keep an outlook for his own safety
and thus the instruction given amounts to a positive instruction that Steve West would be negligent if an ordinarily prudent man could have foreseen that the truck while being loaded
might be set in motion and that it would likely run upon the
general area where Steve West was reclining. Instruction 12,
we submit, was necessary and sufficient to enable the jury to
make the determination as to whether or not Steve West was
contributorily negligent.
The only proper theory upon which the defendants could
rely was, that Clyde Cox was not negligent; that he acted as
a reasonably prudent man would under the circumstances of
the case; and that Steven West was guilty of contributory
negligence. The special interrogatories and instructions, as
given, submitted this theory to the jury.
The defendants set forth on page 46 of their brief Instruction No. 10 and assert that such Instruction states the
correct rule of law applicable to the case and that it sets forth
the defendant's theory of the case. A perusal of the instructions
indicates that it is erroneous. The instruction as requested gives
to Clyde Cox an absolute right to assume that the brakes were
securely set so as to hold the truck in place during the loading
operation. As pointed out in Point I of plaintiff's brief, such
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is not the law and it would have been error to give Instruction
No. 10.
The special verdict, as submitted to the jury in part II, sets
forth the facts to be determined by the jury with regard to
Clyde Cox's negligence and part III sets forth the question
of Steve West's contributory negligence; The instructions,
as given, do nothing more than enable the jury to intelligently
answer these questions. Thus, we submit, there is no error
prejudicial to the defendants.

POINT IV
THE SUBMISSION OF THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORY TO THE JURY REGARDING THE LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF STEVEN L. WEST WAS PROPER
BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY OF MR. WEST AND THE
TESTIMONY OF THE DOCTOR WHO ATTENDED MR.
WEST SUPPORTED THE SUBMISSION OF THE QUESTION OF LOSS OF YEARLY EARNING CAPACITY TO
THE JURY.
The defendants excepted to the giving of that portion
of Instruction 17 which submitted the question of the loss
of Steven L. West's earning capacity to the jury and also
special interrogatories No. VI and VII on the grounds that
there was no evidence in the record that Steven West sustained
a loss of earning capacity as a result of the accident. The
defendants contend in their statement of facts and in their brief
on page 39 that the only evidence in the record on the point
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of Steven L. West's earning capacity was that the plaintiff
earned $2,600.00 per annum for the year 1952 as disclosed
by his income tax returns and $2,400.00 during the year 1951,
but since his recovery he had been earning $300.00 per month.
They make the further assertion that there is no evidence
in the record whatsoever that he was qualified for or could
earn in excess of $300.00 per month were it not for his injuries. Such contention we submit is without merit. Mr. West
testified (R-336) that during the year 1951 he worked on and
off for a period of about five months and that the rest of the
time he was prospecting. That the prospecting produced him
no income. This evidence alone, we submit, is sufficient to
allow the jury to make a determinaton as to Mr. West's loss
of earning capacity. If a plaintiff uses his time for any valuable purpose, though he doesn't actually earn any money by it,
he should be allowed the reasonable value thereof. District
of Columbia vs. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450, 10 S. Ct. 990. If
a further evidence of Mr. West's earning capacity be necessary,
he testified (R-334) that he could and did in some months
gross as much as $800.00 per month. His testimony also indicates that he could make four trips per week and make a net
profit on each trip of $45.00. Based upon three trips per week
wherein he would gross $60.00 per trip or a total or $180.00
and his expenses for three trips being $45.00, Mr. West would
net $135.00 per week or an average of $540.00 per month.
The testimony of Dr. Hubbard (R-238, 239), makes it clear
that Steven West will never be able to do heavy work again.
Dr. Hubbard testified as follows:

"Q Do you think he will ever be able to do that
type of work ?
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A He won't be able to do that heavy trucking. No.

Q And for how long, at any time? Will he ever be
able to do it again?
A Well, I thing the trucker the way-of course, I
maybe don't understand that but he won't be able to do
any heavy physical work that he has done in the past.

Q As long as he lives, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, that means that. I mean the heavy lifting, truck work, heavy physical work, shoveling or
scooping or the type of work they do would do that."
Such evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's findings
as to Steven L. West's loss of earning capacity and it was not
error to submit this issue to the jury.

POINT V
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION, NUMBER 9 (a) REGARDING THE RIGHT TO RELY ON DUE CARE OF
ANOTHER, AND NUMBER 12 REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
ORDINARY CARE OF COX, ARE NOT CONTRADICTORY INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE CLYDE COX DID
NOT HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO RELY UPON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT HAL ANDERSON WOULD
NOT BE NEGLIGENT, BUT COULD ONLY SO RELY
UNTIL SOME ACT WAS DONE BY HAL ANDERSON
TO INDICATE TO THE CONTRARY OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATED THAT HAL ANDERSON MIGHT
BE NEGLIGENT.
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The defendants in arguing that the court's Instructions
Nos. 9 a and 12 are contradictory base their assumption upon
an erroneous interpretation of the law, i.e., that Clyde Cox
was entitled to absolutely rely upon the non-negligence of
Hal Anderson. As heretofore discussed in Point I, such is
not the law. Even as given, Instruction No. 9a, gives Clyde
Cox the right to rely upon the assumption that Hal Anderson
would not be negligent only until some act was done by Hal
Anderson to indicate to the contrary.
Viewed in the light of the true rule that Clyde Cox was
entitled to rely upon Hal Anderson only if a reasonably prudent man would have done so under the circumstances, the
two instructions herein involved are not contradictory in that
Instruction No. 12 or the paragraph of which the defendants
complain merely sets forth the facts and circumstances of
the case which could be considered by the jury in determining
whether or not Clyde Cox acted as a reasonably prudent man
under the circumstances. The cases of Konold vs. Rio Grande
Western Railway (Utah) 21 Utah 379, 60 Pac. 1021; Jensen
z·s. Utah Railway (Utah), 72 Utah 376, 270 Pac. 349, and
State vs. Waid (Utah), 92 Utah 279, 67 Pac. (2d) 647, are
cases in which the instructions, as given, were in irreconcilable
conflict on a material point and, of course, such instructions
were held to be error. However, in the case at bar the instructions, as given, can be reconciled. Clyde Cox was entitled to
the assumption that Hal Anderson would not be negligent
only until some act was done on his part to indicate to the
contrary. While we submit this is not the true rule of law,
it was to the defendants' benefit that it was given in such a
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restnchve manner. Under the instructions the jury was entitled to determine. first whether or not there was some act on
the part of Hal Anderson which would put Clyde Cox on
notice that he might have been negligent. Once having made
this determination under Instruction 9a the jury was then
entitled to determine whether or not Clyde Cox failed to use
ordinary care and were entitled to consider the circumstances
as set forth in Instruction No. 12. Viewed in this light, we
submit that there is no conflict in the instructions. They are
not contradictory and are not irreconcilable and therefore the
cases cited do not require a reversal on this ground.
The question as to whether or not Hal Anderson committed some act or did some act which would put Clyde Cox on
notice of his negligence was not submitted to the jury nor did
the court make a finding thereon. The defendants did not request that such an issue be submitted and therefore if such finding is necessary to support the verdict of the jury, such finding
shall be deemed to have been made in accordance with the
judgment on the special verdict. Rule 49 (a) U.R.C.P. The
last sentence provides in part as follows:
"As to an issue omitted without such demand the
court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it
shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with
the judgment on the special verdict.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
THE GIVING AND THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE IN55
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STRUCTIONS COMPLAINED OF BY THE DEFENDANT
BECAUSE IN SUBMITTING A CASE TO THE JURY ON
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, ONLY SUCH INSTRUCTIONS AS WILL ENABLE THE JURY TO INTELLIGENTLY ANSWER THE INTERROGATORIES NEED BE GIVEN.
The defendants complain of the failure of the court to
give certain instructions requested and not heretofore discussed. Defendants request No. 15 is the usual instruction
given in a general verdict case. However, bearing in mind
that this case was submitted on written interrogatories such
instruction would have served no useful purposes. The Court
in Instructions No. 17 as given (R-125) instructed the jury
in part as follows:
"Before you answer the question pertaining to damages in your special verdict you ought to report to the
court to see if it is necessary to answer these questions."
The jury did not follow this instruction but continued
and answered all of the interrogatories. (See remarks of the
court, (R-498) . The jury answered the questions with regard
to negligence and contributory negligence first and the failure
to report back to the court to determine whether or not it
was necessary to answer the questions on damages cannot
or was not prejudicial to the defendants herein. Defendants
also complain that their Instruction No. 6 (R-104) submitting
the issue of unavoidable accident was not given. The issue
of unavoidable accident was not submitted to the jury nor
was it requested by the defendants that the issue be submitted.
The issue of inevitable or unavoidable acciodent is submitted
to the jury only where the evidence tends to show that the
56
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

injury resulted from some cause other than the negligence of
the parties. The rule is stated in 65 CJS 1192, Sec. 264 (e) as

follows:
"Ordinarily the issue of inevitable or unavoidable
accident should be submitted to the jury where it is
raised by the evidence; and such issue is raised when,
and only when, there is evidence tending to prove that
the injury resulted from some cause other than the
negligence of the parties. It is not raised and may not
be submitted for consideration by the jury where either
party was guilty of negligence in the situation which
resulted in the injury, or if there is no evidence tending
to prove that something other than the negligence of
one of the parties caused the injury complained of;
and the fact that the action is against two alleged
tort-feasors does not alter the rule, since a dispute in
the evidence as to whether the injuries resulted alone
from the negligence of one of the defendants presents
a question of sole proximate cause and not a question
of unavoidable accident."
Defendants' requested Instruction No. 7 (R-105) could
have been proper only if the verdict had been a general verdict.
The jury was instructed on proximate cause in Instruction
No.9. Under such instruction the jury could have answered the
special interrogatories in such a manner as to find that the
negligence of Hal Anderson was the sole proximate cause of
the accident. This they did not do.
It is not necessary in .submitting special interrogatories
to the jury that the jury be instructed on the general law of
the case. Only such instructions should be given as necessary
to enable the jury to answer the special interrogatories. This
rule is set forth in 88 C. J.S. 8 3·7, Sec. 317, as follows:
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"Where a case is submitted to the jury for a special
verdict or on special issues it is unnecessary and erroneous to instruct the jury generally as to the law of
the case, but instructions as to general rules of law
should be given as far as they are reasonably necessary
to enable the jury to answer the special questions intelligently and in accordance with the law."
See also 53 Am. Jur. 493-, Sec. 638, as follows:
"Where a special verdict is required, it is improper
to instruct the jury generally concerning the law of
the case, for the reason that inasmuch as the jury are
not to apply the law to the facts. instructions as to
the law can serve no useful purpose. In such case the
instructions should be confined to matters as are necessary to inform the jury as to the issue made by the
pleadings, and the rules for weighing and reconciling
testimony, who has the burden of proof as to the
facts to be found, and whatever else may be necessary
to enable the jury clearly to understand their duties
concerning such special verdict, and the facts to be
found therein."
The defendants complain that the gtvmg of court Instruction No. 17 required the jury to return a verdict for th~
plaintiff. Particular reference is made to the last part of the
instruction where the court advised the jury that he would
apply a mathematical formula. We must keep in mind that the
issues were submitted to the jury on special interrogatory and
not a general verdict. The jury in this case had determined the
questions of negligence and contributory negligence prior to
the time they considered the question of damages and even
assuming that the instruction did require the jury to make
the findings complained of such fact does not prejudice the
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defendants. ·It is the court that enters the judgment and determines the amount of the verdict.
In this case the court instructed the jury properly to
enable them to answer all of the questions propounded and
the giving and the· failure to give the instructions complained
of by the defendants was not error.

CONCLUSION
The defendants' approach to the problems herein involved
and the defendants' entire argument is based upon the erroneous
premise that Clyde Cox had an absolute right to rely upon
the fact that Hal Anderson would not be negligent and that
the brakes had been securely set and that the truck would
not move when he commenced to load it. Under the law and
even under the instructions of the court, as given, Clyde Cox
had this right only until he was put on notice to the contrary.
The jury by its answers to the special interrogatories and the
trial court by its judgment found Clyde Cox guilty of negligence and Steven West free from contributory negligence.
They found that some act on the part of Hal Anderson apprised Cox that Anderson had not taken the precautions
necessary to insure the safety of the truck.
In the interest of accuracy we would point out that the
American Fuel Company is not a corporation as stated by the
defendants in their brief, page 48.
The defendants have had the advantage which a special
verdict necessarily gives to a defendant. They imply that the
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Jury was sympathetic to the plaintiff because of the severe
injuries and for that reason returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
Such, we submit, is not the case. The jury answered questions
of ultimate fact and did not return a general verdict.
We respectfully submit that in view of the foregoing
authorities and arguments that the judgment of the trial court
based upon special interrogatories of the jury should not be
set aside upon appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDERSON AND TAYLOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent Steven L. West

345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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